proper forum for applying the rule. Part I provides a general history of joint ownership and the duty to account and suggests that the number of litigants presenting joint ownership claims will probably increase. Part II discusses joint ownership case law chronologically. This Part shows that the case law is consistent with the view that the duty to account was a creation of the federal courts. Part III argues that the accounting rule is federal common law and that federal jurisdiction necessarily follows for all copyright accounting cases. But even if the courts hold that the duty to account is state law, this Part argues that jurisdiction does not always lie in the state courts. Federal courts should exercise jurisdiction over actions in which the plaintiff pleads copyright ownership by virtue of joint authorship.
I. HISTORY OF THE JOINT OWNERSHIP CONTROVERSY
This Part examines the history of joint copyright ownership. Section I.A discusses the evolution of joint copyright ownership, which culminated with the recognition of the duty to account. Section I.B describes how the Copyright Act of 1976 and later judicial interpretations of that Act have combined to increase the likelihood of joint ownership disputes. With greater numbers of disputes, the courts will need to resolve the jurisdictional questions over the duty to account.
A. Historical Background of Joint Ownership and the Duty To Account
The controversy over the source of the duty to account can best be understood by looking at the historical development of the law of joint ownership. Until the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, 5 the courts created and developed the law of joint ownership. 6 In many respects, the joint ownership provisions in the 1976 Act merely codify this judge-made law. 7 Thus, uncertainty in the present federal statute arises directly from uncertainty in the previous case law. This section discusses the development of the joint ownership case law.
The courts had at least three choices from which to fashion the rules governing copyright coowners. The simplest is to allow each coowner to exploit the work freely with no duty to account. This was the earliest rule, set forth in Carter v. Bailey, 8 which held that an owner could reproduce and sell a jointly authored book without the consent of the other owner and without accounting for the profits.
5. 17 u.s.c. § § 101-810 (1988 [Vol. 90:1998 This rule, which was consonant with the patent laws, 9 may have led to wider publication of already-existing works, because one owner was not able to veto another owner's exploitation of a work. 10 Later courts rejected the Carter rule, however, on the ground that exploitation by one owner may effectively destroy the residual value of the copyright to the other owners. 11 Commentators also pointed out that the rule may lead to a race between joint owners to exploit a work and thus a waste of the value of the copyright. 12 A second rule, the English rule, provides that no coowner may exploit his interest in a copyright without the consent of all coowners.13 This rule thwarts the owners' race to exploit by preventing such exploitation until all owners agree to an equitable distribution of the profits. But the English rule may impede publication of a joint work because a would-be copyright licensee may be unable to obtain the consent of all coowners. I4 American courts have rejected the Carter rule and have universally settled on a third position: A coowner may exploit a joint work without the other owners' consent but must account to the other owners for all resulting profits. Is Like the English rule, the accounting rule prevents any owner from depleting the value of the copyright at the expense of the other owners. It also deters a destructive race among owners to exploit the copyright. 16 By allowing independent exploitation by each owner, the accounting rule impedes publication less than the English rule. Furthermore, the accounting rule avoids the unfairness that sometimes results under the Carter rule. An unsophisticated coauthor who made no contractual provision for sharing the profits would be able to recover under the accounting rule, but not under Carter v. Bailey. Such considerations of fairness have caused some courts to justify the duty to account on the ground of a constructive trust between joint copyright owners. 17 The Copyright Act of 1976 incorporated the accounting rule without modification. 18 The Act itself only briefly addresses the issue. The 1976 Act defines joint work as "a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." 19 The Act's only explicit mention of coownership provides that such joint authors are "coowners of copyright in the work." 20 The Committee Reports explain the brevity of these provisions as follows:
There is also no need for a specific statutory provision concerning the rights and duties of coowners of a work; court-made law on this point is left undisturbed. Under the bill, as under the present law, coowners of a copyright would be treated generally as tenants in common, with each coowner having an independent right to use or license the use of a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other coowners for any profits. 21 Thus, the present state of the accounting rule under the 1976 Act is found in the case law that fashioned the rule.
B. Increasing Importance of Joint Ownership and the Duty To Account
Although the duty to account changed little with the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, the 1976 Act substantially changed previous doctrine on work for hire. 22 This section explores how receµt Supreme Court interpretation 23 of the work-for-hire provisions of the 1976 Act may increase the number of litigants claiming joint ownership of copyright. Such an increase demands that the courts resolve the jurisdictional issue concerning the duty to account.
Exclusive federal jurisdiction over federal copyright issues makes a clear choice of forum especially important in copyright accounting cases. State courts normally have concurrent jurisdiction over federal questions. 24 Exclusive federal jurisdiction, 25 however, means that a state court must dismiss the complaint of a plaintiff who erroneously brings a copyright action in state court. On the other hand, courts 17 . See e.g., Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1915 25. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) ("Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in ... copyright cases."). [Vol. 90:1998 have traditionally considered many of the disputes over transfer of copyright ownership to be state contract questions. 26 The federal courts have jurisdiction only over contract disputes that satisfy the requirements of diversity or supplemental jurisdiction and will dismiss claims if incorrectly brought in federal court. 27 The plaintiff must therefore make the correct choice of forum or suffer dismissal. 28 This problem of battling exclusivities occurs only in the few areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction, 29 and it can cause substantial hardship if, as in the case of joint ownership and the duty to account, the proper forum is unclear.
Under the Copyright Act of 1909, copyright initially vested in the employer in the case of a work made for hire. 30 The 1909 Act left to the courts the task of defining the terms employer and works made for hire. 31 Courts eventually concluded that a work was made for hire when the employer had the right to control or supervise the creation of the work; 32 the employer did not have to participate in or have actual control over its creation. 33 This "right to control" standard presumed that a person who hired either an independent contractor or a traditional employee to produce a work was the statutory author and thus the copyright owner. 3 4 The Copyright Act of 1976 and its interpretation in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid 35 radically curtailed the work-forhire doctrine. The 1976 Act limits works made for hire to two types: first, works prepared by employees, and second, certain categories of works prepared by independent contractors. 36 A work created by an independent contractor qualifies as a work made for hire only if it falls under one of nine categories enumerated in the definition, and only if the parties expressly agree in writing to consider it a work made for hire. 37 This provision changes previous law considerably, giving the independent contractor, rather than the hiring party, the initial copyright in a work unless the work falls under one of the exceptions. Some courts resisted this interpretation for several years, 38 even though a plain reading of the statute supports it. 39 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid 40 ended the controversy by holding that the principles of the general common law of agency4 1 determine whether a creator is an employee or an independent contractor. 42 If the creator is an independent contractor and the work does not fall under one of the nine enumerated categories, the copyright initially vests with the creator.43
Reid will likely increase litigation under the definition of joint work in the 1976 Act. 44 Before Reid, joint authorship problems seldom arose because the copyright almost inevitably vested in the hiring party. But now that copyright will more often initially vest with creators, questions involving the scope of each author's contribution to the work and the authors' intentions to create a joint work will necessarily arise. For example, independent contractors may dispute copyright ownership with their employers. 45 Or the actual creators of a work may dispute copyright ownership among themselves. These new joint authorship disputes will often produce concomitant demands for an accounting, putting greater pressure on courts to decide whether the duty to account is state or federal law. 46 37. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1988). These categories include works that are commissioned for use [1] 
45.
Reid itself is an example of an employer-independent contractor dispute and of the increased importance of joint authorship under the 1976 Act. In Reid, a sculptor was hired to create a statue as part of a larger work being built by the hiring party. Under the 1909 Act, the copyright to the sculpture would have automatically vested in the hiring party. But here the Supreme Court held that the sculptor was an independent contractor and thus had the initial copyright to his sculpture. The Court left open, probably for further litigation, the possibility that the combined work could be considered a joint work. 490 U.S. at 753.
46. But see 1 ABRAMS, supra note l, § 4.02
(claiming that the Restatement definition of employee is nothing more than a "right to control" standard, similar to that prevailing before the enactment of the 1976 Act; thus, the rights of independent contractors are not expanded under Reid).
[Vol. 90:1998 Because the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in copyright cases, 47 this increase in cases may create practical problems. For example, if a plaintiff commissions and closely directs the creation of a work by an independent contractor and then brings suit against the contractor, the plaintiff has two possible claims: sole or joint authorship. He may claim infringement based on sole authorship, arguing that he is the author "in the same way a poet is author of a poem that she dictates to a stenographer." 48 He may also have the option of claiming sole authorship and infringement under the work-for-hire doctrine, arguing that the work falls under one of the nine enumerated categories of section 101(2) of the 1976 Act. In either case, the action must be pursued in federal courts against the independent contractor.
Alternatively, the plaintiff may base his claim on joint authorship in the work by virtue of his contribution to the creation. 49 As a joint author, he would have to sue for an accounting, not for infringement. If the plaintiff brings the action in federal court, he runs the risk of dismissal if the court disallows the infringement count; if he proceeds in state court, the same fate may await him if the court holds that the accounting rule is an exclusively federal action. 50
The jurisdictional issue is not the only question concerning duty to account that the courts will have to resolve as these cases arise with increasing frequency. The courts must also decide how to apportion profits among coauthors. In Reid, the D.C. Circuit ruled that anyone who contributes more than a de minimis amount to the work is a coauthor51 and receives an equal share of the profits, "even where it is clear that [the] This rule leads to equitable results only when a small number of joint authors contribute roughly equally to a work. When persons making varying contributions to a work all claim joint author status, however, the proceeds from the work will be distributed unfairly. As fewer employers automatically obtain sole ownership of copyright, such fact patterns may occur with greater frequency.
This apportionment of profits among joint owners is not a jurisdictional issue, but its resolution depends on the source of the duty to account. If courts determine that the duty to account is federal law, federal courts will have a greater hand in fashioning the law that apportions the profits among joint owners. Thus, deciding whether the accounting rule is of state or federal origin will shape the evolution of the rule. This Part outlines the case law relevant to a copyright coowner's duty to account to other owners. These decisions show that the duty to account arose in its modem form almost entirely by means of federal court decisions. The origination of the accounting rule in the federal courts supports the claim that the accounting rule is a federal common law remedy.
Three overlapping stages in the case law define the development of the jurisdictional question. Section II.A discusses the period beginning in the early part of the century, but developing mostly in the 1940s and 1950s, in which courts created the duty of a coowner to account to other joint owners of a copyright. The decisions of this era, rendered almost entirely by the federal courts, never explicitly mentioned the jurisdictional question. Section II.B discusses the next line of case law, which began in the late 1950s and continues to the present. These courts have held that the duty to account is a state common law remedy. Most have held that only infringement can be litigated under federal law, and that an action to determine title alone, the crux of most accounting cases, is not a federal question. Barring diversity jurisdiction or pendent jurisdiction arising from other federal claims, these courts have dismissed cases concerning the duty to account. Finally, section II.C discusses two cases from the 1980s holding that at least some disputes over the duty to account involve the application and interpretation of the copyright ownership provisions of the 1976 Act and so are properly federal questions. [Vol. 90:1998 A.
Early Cases
The earliest American cases dealing with joint ownership of copyright and the duty to account were actually state, not federal, cases. These decisions, however, held that a coowner had no duty to account for profits, and thus they cannot be considered the source of the modem accounting rule. These courts apparently derived jurisdiction from the assumption that joint ownership of copyright was identical to common law tenancy-in-common and was hence a state law matter.
The first American case dealing with joint ownership and the duty to account, Carter v. Bailey, 53 involved the reproduction of a copyrighted book by one owner without the consent of the other owner. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the defendant could reproduce the book without consent and with no duty to account for the profits. In another early state court case, Nillson v. Lawrence, 54 the court held that coowners of a play could exploit the play without the consent of other coowners and refused to award the plaintiff either an injunction stopping the production of the play or an accounting for profits. Neither of these state courts explicitly mentioned the jurisdictional question. Both apparently considered the coowners to be tenants in common and applied common law property rules. 55 The federal courts originated the modem duty to account after the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909. 5 6 The 1909 Act failed to address many copyright problems, 57 including the problems of joint ownership. To fill these gaps, the federal courts, especially the Second Circuit, played an increasing role in adapting the language of the statute to the needs of the modem publishing and communication industries.
The federal courts' attempts to fashion the rights and remedies of copyright coowners began in 1915 with Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Maurel v. Smith. 58 Maurel contains the first judicial recognition of the duty to account. 59 The plaintiff, an author of a comic opera, brought suit against her coauthors, who had taken out a copyright in their names only and entered into a licensing agreement with a publisher. The court held that the defendants held the copyright in a con- structive trust for the plaintiff, and so were "accountable to the plaintiff [to] share and share alike" the royalties from the license. 60 The defendant unsuccessfully challenged the court's jurisdiction, but only on the basis that the amount in controversy did not reach the minimum of $3000 then required for federal jurisdiction. 61 The silence of the record implies that federal jurisdiction over the dispute was otherwise uncontroversial. 62 The federal courts reaffirmed the accounting rule of Maurel v. Smith in several decisions beginning in the 1940s. 63 By this time, the federal cases acknowledged the two bases for the duty to account: the theory of a constructive trust between coowners and the theory of depletion or destruction of the copyright by one coowner. 64 State cases recognizing the duty to account, on the other hand, came later than these early federal cases and relied on them as precedent. [Vol. 90:1998 nia state courts in 1945, acknowledged an author's duty to account to his coauthors for the profits from licensing a song. 69 Unlike the previous cases, however, the Brown cases unquestionably triggered state jurisdiction because the songs at issue were unpublished and thus protected only by state common law, not federal statutory, copyright. 70 In summary, the federal cases originated the accounting rule after it had been rejected by early state court cases. The federal courts, which made no explicit mention of the jurisdictional question, seemed to have taken federal jurisdiction as a given. 71 State courts began to enforce the duty to account only after the federal courts had settled the scope of the duty.
B. Cases Denying Federal Jurisdiction over the Duty To Account
A line of cases beginning in the late 1950s holds that claims involving the duty to account do not give rise to federal jurisdiction. 72 The duty to account rarely arises in isolation; it flows from a title dispute among copyright owners over either a contractual assignment of the copyright or joint authorship. 73 For either contract or joint authorship cases, this line of authority considers the adjudication of a copyright title dispute and the concomitant duty to account to be exclusively a state court matter. 74 Some cases decided in the Second Circuit have taken the position that federal jurisdiction is only proper when the complaint alleges copyright infringement. These courts consider any other copyright cause of action, including the duty to account, to be based on state law. Harrington v. Mure, 75 a joint authorship case, illustrates this position. The plaintiff sued for a declaration that he was a coowner of a copyright, for an assignment of his share of the copyright, and for an accounting for the profits. 76 The court held that, 69. 156 P.2d at 41. 70. The 1976 Act completely preempts common law copyright, thus eliminating the role of the states in protecting these rights in unpublished works. 17 U.S.C. § 30l(a) (1988).
71. None of the cases makes clear whether the federal courts were relying on diversity juris· diction or federal question or copyright jurisdiction. See supra note 61. The absence of any language explaining federal jurisdiction in most of these cases indicates that the courts did not address the question at all. The most likely explanation is that the courts had simply not thought through the jurisdictional question, perhaps because no party raised it. [a]bsent a basis for a claim of infringement, a case presenting a claim of equitable ownership with a prayer for an assignment and an accounting does not "arise under the Copyright Law." ... The sources of the obligations to assign and to account are equitable doctrines relating to unjust enrichment and general principles oflaw governing the rights of co-owners, not remedial provisions of the Copyright Law. 7 7
Other cases extended the Harrington holding to deny federal jurisdiction to contract cases. 78 Courts have also denied federal jurisdiction to accounting cases whose classification as joint authorship or contract cases is ambiguous. 79 Despite the holdings in these cases, however, state courts have rarely taken up Harrington's invitation to litigate copyright accounting cases. 80
C. Cases Recognizing Federal Jurisdiction over the Duty To Account
Like previous Second Circuit cases, T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu 81 held that a dispute over an alleged assignment of copyright renewal rights did not arise under the copyright laws and thus did not give rise to federal jurisdiction. The reasoning employed by the Harms court, however, differed from that of other Second Circuit cases such as Harrington, 82 which claimed that federal jurisdiction arose only in actions of infringement. The Harms court concluded that in certain circumstances, remedies not expressly granted by the Copyright Act should trigger federal jurisdiction. Judge Friendly, writing for the court, formulated a three-pronged test to guide courts in deciding when an ac- ship cases. The plaintiff in Keith was allegedly a joint author who licensed his coauthor to exploit the copyright; the plaintiff in Newman assigned his rights to his coauthor in return for royalties.
Both cases were dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, the courts holding that [Vol. 90:1998 tion involving a copyright arises under the copyright laws. This test was the basis for recent cases holding that the duty to account arises under the copyright laws in certain circumstances and thus should be subject to federal jurisdiction. 8 3 The Harms test states that an action arises under the copyright laws [1] if and only if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act, ... or [2] asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act, • . . or, [3] at the very least and perhaps more doubtfully, presents a case where a distinctive policy of the Act requires that federal principles control the disposition of the claim. 84 The first prong of the Harms test merely covers the remedies for "a suit for infringement" 85 now listed in chapter 5 of the current Copyright Act. 86 The next two prongs, however, expand the jurisdiction of the court beyond actions solely for infringement.
Lieberman v. Estate of Chayefsky was the first case to establish federal jurisdiction over the duty to account using the Harms test. 87 The plaintiff in Lieberman claimed to have coauthored a novel and screenplay with the defendant. When the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment of joint ownership and an accounting for the profits, the defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court determined that the central issue in the case was the resolution of the claim for joint authorship, which derives from the definition of joint work in the Copyright Act. 88 Relying on the second prong of the Harms test, the court held that "[r]esolution of the central issue in this case depends upon the application and interpretation of this statutory definition" 89 and that the court thus had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims.
Goodman v. Lee, 90 a Fifth Circuit case with similar facts, followed the reasoning of Lieberman. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that she was a coauthor of a song as well as an accounting for her share of the profits. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The appeals court reversed, using the second prong of the Harms test and citing Lieberman to validate federal jurisdiction. 91 The Goodman 91. Goodman, 815 F.2d at 1031-32. The reasoning of the Goodman court differed formally from that of Lieberman, although the result was identical. Goodman held that resolution of the court attempted to distinguish this case from earlier Second Circuit cases, including Harrington v. Mure, 92 denying federal jurisdiction in copyright accounting cases. The court characterized the earlier cases as contract cases, whereas Goodman and Lieberman involved the construction of the joint authorship provisions of the Act. 93 Goodman implied that previous case law supported federal jurisdiction for joint authorship cases but not for contract cases. 94 Although Goodman's distinction between contract and joint authorship cases may be logical and correct, it does not accurately reflect the cited case law. Previous cases decided in the Second Circuit denied federal jurisdiction to both types of copyright accounting cases. 95 The facts of Harrington, for example, are nearly identical to those of Goodman: the plaintiff, alleging that he was a coauthor of a musical composition, sought a declaration of coownership and an accounting for his share of the profits, but the court denied federal jurisdiction. 96 Both Goodman and Harrington are joint authorship cases, and both, according to Goodman, should give rise to federal jurisdiction. 97 The Goodman court, despite its claims to the contrary, was thus unsuccessful in reconciling the earlier case law.
D. Summary of the Circuit Split
Until Lieberman was decided in 1984, the Second Circuit adhered to a near-blanket rule that an action to establish title does not arise under the Copyright Act and is thus a state law question. Since most cases concerning the duty to account arise under disputes of title between joint owners, the Second Circuit relegated the duty to account to state courts, barring supplementary or diversity jurisdiction. The case depended on the interpretation of the copyright ownership provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), rather than the statutory definition of joint work in 17 U. 100 Thus, the rule in the Ninth Circuit renders the duty to account a state law question. Federal courts in the Fifth Circuit accept jurisdiction over duty-to-account claims in cases involving joint authorship. The Second Circuit rule is itself unsettled; under Lieberman, the most recent case, the duty to account will also be decided by federal courts in cases involving joint authorship.
The Fifth Circuit attempted to resolve this divergence by claiming that in all circuits an action to establish title, and the concomitant duty to account, arises under federal copyright law when the claim involves a dispute over joint authorship; when the claim involves a contract dispute, however, an action to establish title flows from state common law principles. 101 Although the logic of this position may be sound, it does not accurately reflect the present state of the case law in the Second and Ninth Circuits. In these circuits, joint authorship claims have been held not to arise under the copyright laws, and the holdings of both contract and joint authorship cases are often written in language that categorically excludes from federal courts any actions other than actions for infringement. Part Ill of this Note sorts out the logic underlying these positions.
III. THE CLAIM FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DUTY ToAccouNT
A federal court that has received a copyright complaint requesting an accounting must consider two questions before it can exercise juris-. diction. First, it must ask whether the duty to account is federal or a state law. After this preliminary inquiry, it may go on to ask whether federal court is the correct forum for the complaint. The first question -the source of the duty to account -allows at least two possible answers. A court may hold that copyright ownership, although established by federal law, is merely another form of ownership, governed by ordinary state common law rules. In this view, copyright coowners would be treated like tenants in common of any other type of property. 102 sis: the duty to account, created by the federal courts as federal common law and ratified by Congress in the Copyright Act of 1976, is more properly considered federal law.
Section III.B discusses the second question, that of the correct forum. If the duty to account comes from federal common law, the federal courts have jurisdiction. The question grows more complicated, however, if courts consider the duty to account to be state law. This section argues that joint authorship cases should trigger federal jurisdiction, even if the source of the accounting remedy is state law, because of the federal interest in construing the joint authorship provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976. Only if the plaintiff claims rights by virtue of contract rights alone -that is, by assignment of copyright -should the federal court dismiss the case in favor of state jurisdiction.
Section III.C discusses the application of the well-pleaded complaint rule to copyright accounting cases. It concludes that if the duty to account is federal law, the rule will not bar federal jurisdiction. If the duty to account is state law, an allegation of joint authorship in the complaint should satisfy the rule.
A. The Source of the Duty To Account
This section gives two reasons for considering the accounting rule to be a federal remedy. First, the federal courts created the rule by federal common law. Second, Congress ratified the rule in the Copyright Act of 1976. These developments demonstrate that the source of the duty to account is federal.
Federal Common Law
Since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 103 courts have viewed judicial decisionmaking that creates federal common law with suspicion. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's statement that " [t] here is no federal general common law" 104 did not end the creation of all federal common law. The Erie Court simply held that federal courts sitting in· diversity actions must apply the common law of the states to such actions, not a separate federal general common law. 105 On the same day that the Court decided Erie, it affirmed that federal courts retained the power to create common law in areas of federal competence. 106 103. 304 U.S. 64 (1938 Courts and commentators have justified the creation of federal common law in several ways, 10 1 at least three of which may justify the creation of a federal duty to account. First, Congress may have omitted a remedy for joint owners through inadvertence, forcing the courts to create one as an interstitial, gap-filling measure. Second, Congress may have delegated lawmaking power to the federal courts by providing a skeletal legislative scheme, with the expectation that the courts would formulate detailed substantive law as needed. Third, a dominant federal interest in the rights of joint copyright owners may require a federal common law solution and a preemption of state law. This section discusses each of these justifications in turn to see whether they provide adequate support for creating a federal accounting rule.
First, Congress may have simply overlooked the problem, even though it intended to apply federal law. Statute-making is necessarily incomplete because of defects in the political process and the limitations of human foresight. 108 Inadvertent omission is especially likely in copyright law, which is complex and apt to be removed from the experience of most legislators. When a statute is in some way incomplete, the courts often fill the gap. 109 The 1909 Act made no explicit reference to joint ownership, 110 but the statute set up the framework in which two authors may jointly create a work, thereby necessitating an apportionment of rights between them. If the statute is silent, but Congress intended federal law to apply in this area, the federal courts have an obligation to supply the missing terms.
Second, Congress may have intended to delegate to the federal courts the power to create substantive law as needed. Courts have often found an implicit delegation of authority to the courts when confronted with a skeletal legislative scheme. 111 Although the 1909 Act
[A] few areas, involving "uniquely federal interests," .
•. are so committed by the Constitu· tion and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is pre-empted and re· placed, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts -so-called "federal common law." 487 U.S. at 504 (citations omitted). 311, 332 (1980) (asserting that the difference between statutory interpretation and common law is "a difference in emphasis rather than a difference in kind"). as a whole cannot be considered skeletal, the complete lack of reference to joint ownership suggests, if not inadvertence, an implicit delegation of authority to the courts to fill in the gaps. 112 Inadvertent omission or congressional delegation of authority seem plausible in light of the highly specialized nature of copyright legislation. The people that it affects are small in number and concentrated in a few narrow geographic areas. Legislators are unlikely to be familiar with the subject, and they are even less likely to have a great deal of interest in the details of the statute they enact. Inevitably, expertseither a few interested legislators, or, more likely, representatives of the affected industries -will draft the statute, and legislators will vote on it with little idea of what it actually contains. 113 Thus, legislative intent, always difficult to determine, is especially nebulous in copyright law.
The peculiar qualities of the 1909 Act make congressional intent even more difficult to ascertain. The 1909 Act is a curious mixture of extreme specificity in some places and broad generalizations in others. 114 "[T]he statute ... leaves the development of fundamentals to the judges. Indeed the courts have had to be consulted at nearly every point, for the text of the statute has a maddeningly casual prolixity and imprecision throughout." 115 The haphazard quality of this statute, coupled with the abstruseness of the subject to most legislators, makes a conclusive determination of specific congressional intent hopeless in many cases. This intent is even more elusive when one is [Vol. 90:1998 searching for the reason for omission of a provision, rather than the reason for inclusion.
Given the absence of direct evidence of congressional intent concerning the lack of joint ownership provisions in the 1909 Act, evidence of congressional intent must come indirectly from considerations of general policy. These policy considerations argue against an intention to leave the rights of joint copyright owners to the states. Suppose Congress intended that the states should choose how to handle the rights of joint copyright owners. The states would have at least three contradictory ways of doing so: each owner might be required to get permission from all other owners before exploiting the copyright (the English rule); 116 each owner might be free to exploit the copyright subject to a duty to account (the present accounting rule); 117 or each owner might be free to exploit the copyright without any duty to account (as in patent law). 118 Allowing the states to choose any of these three would make the rights of copyright coowners uncertain. Furthermore, even assuming each state decided to use the analogy of tenancy-in-common, the application might vary from state to state. 119 The rights afforded to joint owners might vary, for example, depending on a state court's choice between the rules of coownership of real property as compared to personal property. 120
Allowing the states to determine the rights of a copyright coowner is contrary to all the statutory sources of copyright law: first, the copyright statutes aim for national uniformity of rights; 121 second, the jurisdictional statute gives the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over copyrights, 122 and finally, a constitutional provision allows the federal government, not the states, to establish an author's exclusive right to his writings.123 If Congress in this instance intended to legislate contrary to its general policy of uniformity of copyright remedy, it would likely do so expressly, rather than by simple omission of any relevant provision.
In sum, the omission of provisions relating to the rather obscure problems of joint authorship was likely either an inadvertent omission or a congressional delegation of authority to fill in gaps in the statutory language. The least likely possibility, given the nature of the statute and the policy considerations outlined above, is that Congress or the drafters actually had a specific intent to leave the remedies afforded joint authors to the states, and that they chose to show this intent by simple omission of any relevant provision.
The third and final justification for the use of federal common law -protection of a dominant federal interest -comes from the Supreme Court's opinion in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 124 which "instructs us that even in the absence of express statute, federal law may govern what might seem an issue of local law because the federal interest is dominant." 125 The federal government's overriding interest in national uniformity of rights of copyright owners may be a sufficient justification for creation of the duty to account and the preemption of any contrary state law by the federal courts. 126 Under the Clearfield Trust doctrine, the courts should enforce the duty to account until Congress makes clear in legislation that it does not consider such a remedy to be in the federal interest.
Preemption of state law and creation of federal common law on this ground does not depend on a specific congressional intent in 1909 to delegate authority to the courts. Congress may have given absolutely no thought to the problems of joint ownership. Nevertheless, if the federal courts determine that federal interests would be impaired if state law were applied, they may impose a federal common law solution. 127 The legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides the 124. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). In a dispute over whether a state rule should apply to co=ercial paper issued by the U.S. government, the Court held that in the absence of a federal statute, "it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule oflaw according to their own standards. The presence of federal legislation manifests a congressional determination that important federal interests are at stake, which supersede any competing state concerns. While Congress may not have considered the specific issue before the court, it may still be appropriate in such cases for the federal judiciary to develop its own legal principles.
[Vol. 90:1998 courts with much evidence about congressional purposes and federal interests in copyright. For example, the legislative history of section 301, which abolished state common law copyright law, 128 shows that national uniformity of copyright protection is an important goal of copyright law:
One of the fundamental purposes behind the copyright clause of the Constitution, as shown in Madison's comments in The Federalist, was to promote national uniformity and to avoid the practical difficulties of determining and enforcing an author's rights under the differing laws and in the separate courts of the various States. Today, when the methods for dissemination of an author's work are incomparably broader and faster than they were in 1789, national uniformity in copyright protection is even more essential than it was then to carry out the constitutional intent. 129 The federal courts may use this explicitly stated federal interest in national uniformity to justify preempting conflicting state laws and replacing them with a uniform federal duty to account. By acknowledging that the accounting rule is federal law, federal courts will adjudicate cases that would otherwise have gone to state courts. 130 Some of these cases may not actually tum on federal issues, and one might argue that a federal accounting remedy is therefore 
(1985):
Preemptive lawmaking rests on the idea that federal courts can establish legal rule X. even where there is no specific intention that they do so, provided it can be shown that rule X is necessary in order to avoid frustrating federal policy Y, as to which there is a manifestation of specific intent on the part of the enacting body. Under Professor Merrill's analysis, creating a federal duty to account is legitimate, even in the absence of a specific congressional intent to delegate authority to do so, as long as the court can show that failing to create this remedy will frustrate a clear federal policy, such as uniformity of copyright remedy.
128. Before 1976, copyright in unpublished works was initially secured by state common law copyright. Federal protection became effective only upon publication of the work. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 30l(a) (1988), abolished this dual system of copyright laws. The explicit preemption of state law in this area provides an analogy for the courts to follow in displacing any vestigial state law of joint ownership with a federal duty to account. 133 Second, the federal interest in uniformity of remedy outweighs the burden of having the federal courts adjudicate even those accounting cases where the federal issues are peripheral. Without a federal accounting rule, states would be free to choose among various ways of allocating rights among coowners of copyright. 134 Only plaintiffs who allege infringement would have the benefit of a uniform federal rule.
The provisions for copyright infringement demonstrate that Congress is willing to allow an overinclusive remedy to protect the federal interest in uniformity of remedy. To obtain federal jurisdiction, a copyright infringement plaintiff must show three things: the plaintiff's ownership of the copyright; copying by the defendant; and distribution for exhibition. 135 Ownership usually involves only state law contract issues. But even when the defendant concedes copyfug and distribution, leaving ownership as the only issue in dispute, the complaint confers federal jurisdiction. 136 The federal interest lies in uniform, expert application of the federal remedy. The same federal interest arises in an accounting case in which the only dispute is over contract issues.
The state interest in hearing these cases is small. Although states have a legitimate interest in enforcing their contract laws, the federal courts have been the primary adjudicators of copyright law, including many cases that involve state law contract disputes, since federal jurisdiction over copyrights became exclusive over a century ago. 137 A state's loss of jurisdiction over this small class of specialized cases will only marginally reduce that state's ability to enforce its contract law.
In any event, the Erie doctrine requires a federal judge who tries an accounting case that involves state contract principles to follow state [Vol. 90:1998 contract law. 138 Thus, federal courts will vindicate state interests in the small number of cases taken from state courts.
Congressional Ratification of the Federal Duty To Account
Although policy considerations suggest that Congress intended to allow the federal courts to create federal common law rules governing joint ownership, 139 the only direct expression of congressional intent before 1976 came from congressional failure to pass a statute overruling the federal courts. Courts and commentators generally consider such a failure to act to be weak evidence of congressional intent. 140 The Copyright Act of 1976, however, completely revised the 1909 Act 141 and provided fresh evidence of congressional intent.
The 1976 Act mentions joint ownership explicitly in two places. It offers a definition of joint work, 142 and it provides that joint authors are "coowners of copyright in the work." 143 Thus, the 1976 Act shows that Congress intended joint authorship at least to be determined by reference to federal statute, not state common law. Although the 1976 Act does not mention the duty to account or coownership in general, the legislative history shows unequivocally that Congress intended to retain the duty to account. The House Committee Report on section 201, after first stating that "court-made law on this point is left undisturbed," 144 expressly set out the duty to account: coowners are to be "treated generally as tenants in common, with each coowner having an independent right to use or license the use of the work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other coowners The Copyright Act of 1909, on the other hand, was mostly "a bringing together of scattered statutory provisions with relatively few changes or innovations." Id. 142. "A 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1988 This language demonstrates that Congress envisioned a national, uniform remedy for coowners. 146 Such a remedy will only occur if it is federal law, binding on all courts. 147 Leaving the states free to choose not to enforce a duty to account, or to require the consent of all coowners before exploitation of the copyright, would undermine congressional intent.
Tracing the legislative history chronologically from 1961 to 1965 by means of the Copyright Law Revision provides a similarly straightforward understanding of the legislative intent. 148 The original 1961 report of the Register of Copyrights recommended omitting any mention of the accounting rule in the statute in order to maintain the rule intact from previous case law. 149 This recommendation generated few comments and little controversy. 150 The resulting provisions regarding coownership in the 1964 preliminary draft of the new copyright law were almost identical to those finally passed by Congress in 1976. 151 In short, the drafters of the coownership provisions of the 1976 Act essentially borrowed the original 1961 recommendations of the Copyright Office. The purpose of the provisions, as embodied in the House Committee Report, also remained unchanged. 149. "The rules established by the court decisions in regard to co-owners of a copyrightthat any one co-owner may use or license the use of the work, but that he must account for profits to the other co-owners -should be left undisturbed." 1 Id. at 90. The Copyright Office saw "no need to restate [these rules] in the statute." 1 Id. at 89.
150. A few consultants unsuccessfully recommended changes. For example, Irwin Karp and Melville B. Nimmer recommended adopting the English rule, in which all coowners must agree before the work is exploited. See 2 id. at 318, 374.
151. "The authors of a joint work shall be considered co-owners of copyright in the work." A footnote added that a joint work "would be defined elsewhere as a work prepared by two or more authors in collaboration or with the intention that their contributions be merged into indistinguishable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. [Vol. 90:1998 was a well-established rule, created and applied universally by the federal courts to all copyright coowners regardless of their state residence.152 Regardless of whether the jurisdiction to hear these cases came from federal question jurisdiction 153 or the copyright and patent jurisdiction statute, 154 the federal courts -and implicitly Congressconsidered the duty to account to be a federal remedy.1 5 5
Even if one ignores the legislative history entirely and looks only at the language of the statute, the Copyright Act of 197 6 ratifies previous case law regarding the duty to account. Congressional silence in the Act is stronger evidence of congressional intent than silence before enactment.156 Congressional silence regarding the accounting rule, especially in an act that is such a radical rethinking of previous copyright law, 157 strongly implies a congressional satisfaction with the status quo.
In sum, the federal courts created the duty to account between copyright coowners through a legitimate use of federal common law. The creation of the duty to account can be considered either an interstitial, gap-filling measure, or the result of an implicit delegation of authority from Congress to create detailed law on joint ownership. Congress ratified this federal common law solution when it passed the Copyright Act of 1976. In its Committee Reports, Congress approved of the court-made law regarding the duty to account and set out the details of that law explicitly. The duty to account is thus federal law, and it should be binding on all courts, state or federal. risdiction, initially derives from the constitutional clause extending federal judicial power to all cases "arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." 15 8 The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to give Congress the power to confer jurisdiction whenever a federal law is an "ingredient" of a cause of action. 15 9 Because federal copyright law is an ingredient of any copyright case, federal jurisdiction over the duty to account turns on whether Congress has chosen to confer jurisdiction by statute.
This section shows that jurisdiction for copyright accounting cases depends on whether the courts hold that the accounting rule is federal or state law. If the accounting rule is federal law, as argued in section III.A above, the copyright jurisdiction statute triggers federal jurisdiction. Even if courts hold that the accounting remedy is state common law, the jurisdiction statute triggers federal jurisdiction for joint authorship cases, leaving only contract cases to be adjudicated solely in state courts.
Federal Accounting Rule
Section III.A argued that the duty to account is a common law creation of the federal courts and is thus a federal remedy. A federal common law remedy gives rise to federal jurisdiction in the same way as an explicit statutory remedy. 160 Thus, any copyright coowner who seeks an accounting should be able to raise his claim in federal court. Because courts developed the duty to account to fill a gap in the copyright laws, jurisdiction over the accounting rule falls under section 1338, the patent and copyright jurisdiction statute, 161 rather than section 1331, the federal question jurisdiction statute. 162 Section 1338 gives exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts. [Vol. 90:1998 claims should therefore trigger exclusive federal jurisdiction.
State Accounting Rule
This section assumes arguendo that the duty to account is a state common law rule. It argues that even without a federal accounting rule, the language of the copyright jurisdiction statute is broad enough to give federal jurisdiction over some of the cases in which an accounting is sought: those in which a dispute arises between copyright coauthors. These cases, unlike those involving coowners whose rights arise by contract, involve the interpretation of the joint ownership provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976. The federal interest in the correct interpretation of these provisions suffices to confer federal jurisdiction, even if the remedy sought is held to exist only under state law.
The general federal question jurisdiction statute 164 and the statute dealing specifically with copyrights and other intellectual property 1 6 5 have "arising under" language nearly identical to that of Article III; federal courts, however, have never interpreted these statutes to confer federal jurisdiction whenever the constitutional "ingredient" test is satisfied. 166 Courts have created self-imposed limits to federal jurisdiction for reasons of policy: for example, to avoid usurping the role of the state courts in the federal system, to leave to the states those cases that tum predominantly on state issues, and to avoid overburdening the federal system with cases that only marginally bear on federal interests. 167 The argument for concurrent jurisdiction is strained, however. The duty to account was developed to effectuate the policies of the copyright laws, whose grant of jurisdiction comes under § 1338. Moreover, after the implicit ratification of the duty to account in the Copyright Act of 1976, an action for an accounting can now be said to arise under an "Act of Congress relating to •.. copyrights," i.e., the Copyright Act of 1976. Copyright accounting cases, however, present countervailing considerations weighing in favor of federal jurisdiction, including the desire for national uniformity of remedy and the need for adjudication by a tribunal with expertise in federal issues. 168 The policies favoring federal jurisdiction vary depending on the type of copyright accounting case presented to the court. Joint authorship cases implicate federal interests to a greater degree than contract cases because the rights of joint authors are specifically addressed in the Copyright Act of 1976. 16 The federal courts are bound not only by the jurisdiction statutes, but also by the well-pleaded complaint rule. 209 The Supreme Court in Franchise Tax Board recently reaffirmed the rule: jurisdiction " 'must be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.' " 210 Satisfying one of the two prongs of the Franchise Tax Board test 211 is necessary but not sufficient to give jurisdiction to the federal courts. The well-pleaded complaint rule thus excludes from federal court some suits that pass the Franchise Tax Board test. 212 The Court considers itself obliged to uphold the wellpleaded complaint rule, "for reasons involving perhaps more history than logic," 213 even when it "produce[s] awkward results." 214 The well-pleaded complaint rule does not bar federal jurisdiction if the accounting rule is one of federal law. The plaintiff's complaint will necessarily contain a request for relief in the form of an accounting. With a federal element necessarily present in the complaint, the rule is satisfied. If the accounting rule is a state remedy, however, the well-pleaded complaint rule has the potential of leading to what the Court calls "awkward results." Even if the remedy is based on state law, the well-pleaded complaint rule appears to be satisfied if the plaintiff alleges joint authorship, because a federal issue appears in the complaint. 215 But problems may arise when a complaint contains is-sues of both contract and joint authorship. 216 At this preliminary stage of the litigation, the court will have difficulty piercing the pleadings to find out whether the question of joint authorship is truly at issue. The court may be tempted to consider such a suit to be based on state law and deny jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint rule. 211 Construing the well-pleaded complaint rule to exclude such combination contract/joint author cases from federal jurisdiction would be unwise. The rights of joint authors are based on federal statute and federal judicial interpretation. After Reid, 218 these rights are in a state of flux and should be determined by federal courts, where uniformity can better be enforced. 219 Joint authors' rights fall within the Franchise Tax Board test, requiring "resolution of a substantial question of federal law," 220 and they should not be excluded by the wellpleaded complaint rule.
The well-pleaded complaint rule may also be an obstacle to suits in which sole and joint authorship are pleaded in the alternative. Sole authorship cases involve infringement and are federal matters. 221 If courts consider the duty to account in joint authorship cases to be a state remedy, and if courts further rule that joint authorship claims fail the Harms test, the well-pleaded complaint rule may bar federal jurisdiction: "a claim supported by alternative theories in the complaint may not form the basis for § 1338(a) jurisdiction unless [federal] law is essential to each of those theories." 2 22
A solution to these difficulties is attainable. Courts should hold that a plaintiff's bare allegation of joint authorship in the complaint is sufficient to trigger federal jurisdiction. 223 Unfortunately, federal authorship is necessary to show that the complaint is of the type that federal courts should hear. This should be a sufficient showing of necessity to pass the well-pleaded complaint rule. 810 (1988) . This is a patent law case, but since the same jurisdiction statute applies (28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988)), the result should be the same. The courts should require the plaintiff to allege that he is a joint author, not that he obtained title from an earlier joint author. Joint authorship questions could conceivably arise even in the [Vol. 90:1998 courts may get a number of cases in which plaintiffs plead joint authorship merely to qualify for federal jurisdiction. The court may hope to deter many such cases by quick dismissal or by sanctions. 224 Even if a number of frivolous cases remain, however, federal courts should initially take jurisdiction. To do otherwise would be to eliminate this class of actions from the federal court system, since under the well-pleaded complaint rule, courts must determine jurisdiction initially by looking at the face of the complaint alone. 22 s Courts in similar circumstances have shown a willingness to construe the well-pleaded complaint rule liberally to avoid injustice to the parties and to give the plaintiff his choice of forum. For example, a plaintiff in his pleadings often presents a dispute over an assignment or a license of a copyright as a federal infringement action as follows: the plaintiff rescinds the contract and then sues for infringement, asserting that the defendant is copying the work without permission. Some courts have held that such complaints satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule, even though the actions can also be characterized as state contract disputes. 226 If the infringement claim has no real merit (that is, if the assignment was in fact valid), the court may later dismiss the action in a motion for summary judgment 227 or dismiss at the court's discretion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 22 s Courts should follow the same procedure in joint authorship accounting cases. If the plaintiff alleges he is a joint author on the face of his complaint, the court should deem the complaint to satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule. If the defendant in his answer demonstrates that joint authorship will not be an issue -for example, if the defendant admits to joint authorship and disputes only facts that raise contract issues -the court may immediately dismiss the case for failure to state a cause of action 229 or lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 230 If the court determines later that the joint authorship claim has no merit, and that the suit is predominantly a contract dispute, the court should dismiss the suit without prejudice in a motion for summary judgment, giving the plaintiff an opportunity to bring the claim latter case. But the probability of such questions' arising diminishes the further the plaintiff is removed from joint authorship. This rule, like the well-pleaded complaint rule itself, is a way of allowing federal courts to make a rough cut at the pleading stage when the likelihood that federal issues will arise is low.
224. A joint owner of a copyright is under a duty to account to other owners for their share of any profits realized by the exploitation of the work. This Note supports the position that the duty to account is a federal remedy. It is a creation of federal common law, fashioned by the federal courts to fill gaps in the statutory language of the Copyright Act of 1909, using common law tenancy-in-common as a model.
As a federal remedy, the duty to account promotes national uniformity and expert adjudication of rights of copyright owners, much like the statutory remedy of infringement. As a federal common law remedy, the duty to account "arises under" the copyright laws of the United States, just as the statutory remedy of infringement "arises under" those laws. Thus, a complaint asking for an accounting should be given exclusive federal jurisdiction. The federal interest in national uniformity of remedy outweighs the state interest in adjudicating contract issues arising in disputes involving coowners of copyrights.
Even if the courts reject the preceding analysis and hold that the accounting remedy is a creation of state law, the federal courts should have jurisdiction over at least a portion of the copyright accounting cases. Copyright accounting cases can be divided into two classes: 231. FED. R. Clv. P. 11. 232. A problem may arise if the plaintiff wishes to try a joint authorship case in state court, but the defendant wishes to remove to federal court. Suppose the plaintiff serves a complaint in state court, in which he merely recites the allegation that he is coowner of the copyright without alleging joint ownership. The defendant may want to raise the defense that the plaintiff is not a coowner because he is not a joint author. Should the defendant be allowed to remove the case to federal court? Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988), the defendant may remove a case to federal court if the plaintiff could have brought the case in federal court originally. At first glance, the answer appears to be no: the defendant seems to run afoul of the well-pleaded complaint rule, because the federal element of the claim arises in a defense. But such a defendant may still get federal jurisdiction if the court holds that the allegation of joint authorship is a necessary part of the complaint. That is, the plaintiff, as part of a well-pleaded complaint, must specify whether he intends to rely on joint authorship for his claim of ownership of the copyright. "[A] plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint." Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22 (1983) .
Similarly, a plaintiff who wishes to deny that defendant is a joint author of a work should be able to get a declaratory judgment in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988) . The underlying coercive action -the defendant's suing the plaintiff for an accounting -will satisfy the wellpleaded complaint rule if an allegation of joint authorship is a necessary part of the complaint. [Vol. 90:1998 contract cases, in which coownership of the copyright came about by assignment of the copyright; and joint authorship cases, in which coownership came about from joint contributions to the creation of the work by the coowners. Federal interests are implicated to different degrees in these two classes of disputes. Claims for a declaration of joint authorship and an accounting should be given federal jurisdiction. Such claims "arise under" the copyright laws because they require the application and interpretation of the joint authorship provisions of the copyright statute. These provisions are particularly unsettled after Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, and they require federal interpretation. Contract claims, on the other hand, are at base state law claims, and the concomitant demand for an accounting does not change them into claims that "arise under" the copyright laws, unless the accounting remedy is itself considered federal. Copyright owners want predictable application of the laws and a certain choice of forum. The judiciary, on the other hand, must also concern itself with maintaining a proper balance between the federal and state court systems. The position outlined in this Note -that the duty to account should be considered a federal remedy, and that copyright accounting actions should be tried in federal court -provides the best balance of these competing interests. It provides copyright owners the predictability they need while infringing only marginally on the interests of the states.
